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Social efficiency in Microfinance Institutions 
 
Abstract 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are a special case in the financial world.  They 
have a double financial and social role and need to be efficient at both.  In this paper we 
try to measure the efficiency of MFIs in relation to financial and social outputs using 
Data Envelopment Analysis. For the analysis of financial efficiency we rely on existing 
literature for traditional financial institutions.  To this  we have added two indicators of 
social performance: impact on women, and a poverty reach index.  A series of 
hypotheses on MFIs have been entertained, that concern the relationship between social 
and financial efficiency, and the relationship between efficiency and other indicators, 
such as profitability.  Other aspects studied are the relation between social efficiency 
and type of institution -Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), non-NGO-, and the 
importance of geographical region of activity.  The results reveal the importance of 
social efficiency assessment. 
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The 430 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) listed in Mixmarket, a specialiced 
MFIs database, have an aggregated Gross Loan Portfolio of 5,618 $ millions.  This does 
not seem to be very much when compared to some of the large commercial banks.  For 
example, the equivalent figure for JPMorgan Chase is 225,170 $ millions. But the social 
task performed by MFIs has no equivalent in commercial banks. MFIs lend small 
amounts of money -microcredits- to individuals in a condition of social exclusion who 
have no recourse to traditional sources of finance. The average loan placed by the 430 
MFIs mentioned to their approximately 18 million borrowers is about 300 $.  
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have mushroomed around the world, particularly in 
developing countries. This makes it necessary to assess their performance, something 
that requires developing specially tailored tools.  This paper represents an attempt to 
build a methodology to assess the performance of MFIs. 
MFIs have much in common with traditional banks and other banking 
institutions.  They collect deposits, grant loans and, in due time, collect debts with 
interest. Even though microcredits are, in general, not backed with any collateral, 
repayment rates are quite high, challenging the assumption that poor people do not pay. 
But we should not forget the differences between traditional banks and MFIs. 
MFIs have a social face and their source of income is not only deposits, but also 
donations.  Donors do not only value the financial aspects of the MFIs but also, and 
especially, their social aspects.  Given this dual orientation of MFIs –financial and 
social- the assessment of their performance is based on the so-called Double Bottom 
Line: financial (First Bottom Line) and social (Second Bottom Line).  To date, no 
universal standard has emerged that can be used to measure the second bottom line; see 
Zeller et al. (2002). 
The assessment of MFIs has traditionally been made under the Yaron (1994) 
framework of sustainability and outreach. Outreach or impact evaluates social 
performance, while sustainability focuses on financial performance; examples of the use 
of this methodology are Navajas et al. (2000), and  Dunford (2000). This literature is 
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surveyed by Morduch (1999a).  There is a debate between those who emphasise MFIs’ 
financial aspects, and those who emphasise their social aspects.  These two groups are 
known as institutionists and welfarists; Conning (1999), Woller et al. (1999).  
Institutionists are concerned with financial self-sufficiency and sustainability, and 
appear to be having the upper hand. These argue that sustainability is the most 
important goal of a MFI since a sustainable MFI will survive with its own revenues, 
without the help of external donors; Adams and Von Pischke (1992).  Others say that 
MFIs have to help the poor first; and that sustainability should be a secondary issue; 
Hulme and Mosley (1996). Some enthusiastically support the win-win proposition.  For 
this last group, MFIs that implement good banking practices will also alleviate poverty; 
but this proposition fails to receive good empirical evidence; Morduch (2000). 
Another aspect in the assessment of financial efficiencies that has received much 
attention in recent times is efficiency.  This has been extensively studied in the context 
of traditional banks. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is normally used for the study 
of efficiency; Charnes et al. (1978), Charnes et al. (1990), Thanassoulis (2001).  
Examples of the use of DEA in banking are Sherman and Gold (1985), Berg et al. 
(1993), Berger and Mester (1997), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Athanassoupoulos 
(1997), Seiford and Zhu (1999), Soteriou and Zenios (1999), Kao and Liu (2004), and 
Casu et al. (2004).  In this paper we extend the use of DEA to MFI performance 
assessment.  We will, in particular, extend a previous ly published DEA model designed 
to assess MFI efficiency so that it can deal with both social and financial performance; 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2006).  
The next section of this paper studies the assessment of MFIs taking into 
account both their social and financial aspects.  This is followed by an empirical section 
in which a DEA model is introduced and estimated.  A series of hypotheses pertaining 
to MFIs are discussed next.  The paper ends with a concluding section. 
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2. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their assessment 
 
The performance of MFIs is seldom assessed, and when this has been done, 
financial aspects have been given lip service; Morduch (1999a).   This could, in part be 
due to the data available.  The absence of reliable data is widespread in the case of MFIs 
–although some attempts have been made at ranking them- and when data is available, it 
is often not standardised.  This contrasts with the excellent information available in the 
case of traditional financial institutions.  This is sad because a higher level of 
transparency would result in better mechanisms for funds allocation, to the benefit of 
donors and investors; Tucker (2001). 
In order to address the problem of lack of relevant information, a consortium of 
28 public and private development agencies agreed on a set of guidelines on definitions 
of financial terms, ratios and adjustments for microfinance; see Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poorest- CGAP- (2003).  The set of performance indicators is structured 
around four groups of financial ratios measuring sustainability and profitability, assets 
and liability management, portfolio quality, and efficiency and productivity.  This last 
group of ratios attempts to reflect “how efficiently an MFI is using its resources, 
particularly its assets and personnel” (CGAP, 2003).  Efficiency and productivity 
performance measures usually compare a cost measure with the loan portfolio or the 
number of clients.   
In practice, the financial assessment of MFIs is carried out by conventional 
rating agencies and by rating firms that specialise in microfinances.  However, the first 
group lacks experience in the MFI field, and the second group is not well established 
amongst investors.  Firms that specialise in rating MFIs are beginning to adopt the 
vocabulary of traditional firms, or have searched to be franchised by them. MFI 
financial assessment takes place in two different forms: credit rating, mainly applied to 
microcredit bonds, and global risk assessment, where risk relates to the whole 
institut ion. 
The most important rating methodologies to assess MFIs are CAMEL, GIRAFE, 
M-Cril, Microfinanza, Microrate, MICROS and MIRACLES. Most rating agencies 
adapt Standard and Poor’s methods and concentrate on financial aspects, leaving aside 
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their social function.  CAMEL, GIRAFE, M-Cril, Microrate and Pacific have developed 
their own rating scales. The GIRAFE and MICROS methodologies assess sustainability. 
GIRAFE pays particular attention to efficiency.   
Tools for the assessment of social impact are currently being developed by 
conventional financial institutions under the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). GRI has 
taken upon itself the initiative of issuing sustainability reporting guidelines for the 
drafting of reports containing social and environmental indicators. A framework of 
Social Performance Indicators already exists with specific guidelines on how to 
calculate them; SPI (2003). 
 
Name Description Analysis 
IMP-ACT 
International action-research programme 
that aims at improving the quality of 
microfinancial services and their impact on 
fighting poverty. 
It relies on the collection of quantitative and qualitative 
information from MFI clients. Descriptive statistics, test of 
differences in means and medians, correlations and 
hypotheses tests are generated from data obtained. 
AIMS 
Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise 
Services (AIMS) tries to measure how 
microfinance interacts with their borrowers´ 
lives. 
It places families at the centre of its analysis. It uses qualitative 
and quantitative techniques. It considers hypothesis at 
household, individual, enterprise and community levels. 
SROI 
Social Return On Investment (SROI) 
attempts to measure in the form of an 
investment ratio the social and 
environmental value created by an 
organisation. 
The methodology is still under construction. For example, the 
income generated by enterprise tries to be measured through 
savings to donors. 
ACCION 
PAF 
Accion Poverty Assessment Framework 
(PAF) has been created by Accion, a not-
for-profit North American organisation that 
groups MFIs, many of which are in Latin-
America.  It compares socio-economic 
characteristics of its clients against national 
and international poverty lines (example: a 
$ a day).  
The data it employs at the moment is the data available within 
the MFI. Income or expenditure is compared with poverty lines. 
It analyses correlations and multivariate regressions to assess 
the potential of some variables as proxies of poverty level. For 
example, loan size. 
PAT 
The Poverty Assessment Tool of CGAP 
(PAT) measures poverty outreach by 
placing the clients of a MFI in the context of 
the non-clients. This is the same 
methodology used by United Nations 
Human Development Index (HDI). 
The analysis is done on the basis of 300 poverty indicators that 
are reduced to 30 by means of Principal Components Analysis.  
A poverty index is finally constructed from these indicators. 
SPI 
The Social Performance Indicators Initiative 
(SPI) goes beyond poverty outreach. Social 
performance would have four dimensions: 
Outreach to the poor and excluded, 
adaptation of the services and products to 
the target clients, improving social and 
political capital of clients and communities, 
and social responsibility of MFIs. 
Four dimensions are collected by a questionnaire. The 
answers receive a weighting system from a principal 
components analysis. The results are represented by means of 
a rhombus, whose four vertices give a measure of MFI social 
performance. 
 
Table 1. MFI social assessment methodologies. 
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As far as MFIs are concerned, the standard way of focusing into their social 
performance is through the measures of outreach in Yaron’s framework. The 
methodological issues involved have been surveyed by Hulme (2000) who identifies 
three different paradigms: the scientific method, the humanistic tradition, and 
participatory action learning (PLA). Six methodologies used to assess outreach- the 
social bottom line- deserve further discussion: IMP-ACT, AIMS, SROI, Accion PAF, 
CGAP (PAT) and SPI.  These are described in outline in Table 1. 
 
3. Empirical study 
  
3.1 Sample and data 
In this section we describe an empirical study whose aim is to calculate social 
efficiency in the context of MFIs, and to relate it with financial efficiency and with 
other indicators. 
The data source is the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX).  According 
to its web page (Mixmarket.org), “The MIX intends to address one of the key 
challenges of the microfinance industry: the lack of reliable, comparable and publicly 
available information on the financial strength and performance of Microfinance 
Institutions, which underpins the development of the market for microfinance services”.  
MIX publishes data that has been standardised across the industry, so as to make 
comparisons and benchmarking possible.  The financial information published includes 
balance sheet accounts, and profit and loss accounts.  For each MFI it also publishes 
social information on outreach and impact.  The data used in this study has been 
obtained from the MIX webpage for 89 MFIs for which complete information was 
available. The total number of MFIs in the MIX database is 450.  All the data 
corresponds to the year 2003.  This was the most recent information available at the 
time of the study. 
The data on which the study is based can be seen in Table 2.   In the next sub-
section we discuss input and output selection for the DEA model and describe the logic 
for their selection and their calculation. 
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(Total 
























2cm 2,098,432  185,817  23  2,414  2,913 1,400,438  124,476  
adim 453,931  131,445  20  1,067  1,263 407,798  182,862  
afk 1,777,969  206,967  8  35  154 1,706,577  421,057  
al-ama 30,891,338  4,460,298  421  61,982  96,940 28,677,666  7,864,719  
amssf 1,398,238  361,246  48  5,922  6,748 1,040,756  548,384  
aregak 6,838,049  815,587  92  14,377  13,424 3,987,011  1,800,641  
besa 14,800,554  1,780,563  59  850  2,844 15,114,430  3,423,294  
bpr-a 1,151,171  84,976  29  1,746  3,635 876,130  225,090  
bpr-b 339,901  49,443  17  1,299  1,720 237,946  76,849  
card 11,660,255  1,953,210  446  74,182  73,420 6,141,755  2,672,123  
cbdiba 459,351  185,755  41  2,503  2,762 242,465  59,554  
cca 7,953,192  676,554  55  2,206  4,781 4,582,302  1,004,626  
cccp 1,302,192  322,399  24  4,253  8,486 851,678  261,360  
cep 5,962,215  382,673  103  30,546  39,681 5,261,957  1,173,306  
cerudeb  75,188,694  11,468,664  641  16,978  7,344 34,873,228  15,562,932  
cmmb 54,775  15,219  3  88  158 56,964  17,006  
coac 2,226,595  237,145  19  549  7,537 1,855,718  246,041  
constanta 4,784,453  1,688,978  207  13,197  17,660 3,536,047  1,950,238  
coopec  43,772  7,639  4  12  0 29,821  6,814  
crystal 661,600  167,262  23  754  939 421,403  199,521  
dbacd 11,909,978  512,678  253  8,548  19,069 3,876,526  917,468  
eclof 286,899  69,487  7  1,350  891 407,227  91,720  
emt 7,692,748  1,428,926  208  70,051  88,187 5,765,281  1,687,881  
esed 15,294,519  856,259  378  13,764  18,949 6,834,742  1,900,497  
eshet 782,874  79,450  43  1,969  5,258 462,569  109,726  
faulu 10,538,796  1,738,627  110  10,005  10,330 7,206,344  2,394,206  
fdl 20,511,878  2,595,471  287  12,804  19,438 16,545,332  3,858,505  
finance 751,254  304,889  31  5,584  6,469 434,298  111,181  
finca-t 2,752,181  1,383,505  142  27,444  26,110 1,854,834  1,501,637  
finca-u 3,980,899  2,321,015  214  36,063  34,223 2,798,869  2,539,083  
fjn 9,487,952  1,039,013  111  6,580  8,369 8,037,662  2,635,484  
fmfb 21,492,095  1,124,288  123  0  2,933 1,188,896  793,471  
fodem 1,121,330  3,280,022  27  2,398  2,189 939,824  320,259  
fundacion 2,244,834  686,878  60  9,464  9,282 1,883,446  884,291  
fundeser 1,723,550  395,308  41  2,294  4,624 1,373,113  421,003  
gasha 1,097,506  137,136  69  3,494  5,294 413,742  102,548  
ggls 399,371  419,083  27  2,197  2,215 137,957  105,143  
gk 250,634  71,453  46  2,718  2,663 166,971  43,753  
hope 637,538  168,553  31  1,106  1,415 603,488  183,338  
iamd 105,622  24,049  7  2,711  2,766 56,550  29,662  
idece 66,736  15,425  11  72  131 39,453  16,748  
idf 2,846,745  317,232  302  36,580  35,220 2,626,382  579,149  
imcec-d 1,386,479  154,686  26  1,462  2,685 688,449  177,910  
imcec-t 907,359  171,761  16  451  1,002 571,122  163,644  
issia 347,511  120,334  16  818  1,447 246,792  137,463  
kafc 34,730,011  1,704,334  305  5,168  9,291 29,241,051  4,113,678  
kashf 13,960,978  886,472  262  59,389  56,475 6,271,498  1,697,468  
kpsca 225,444  53,644  10  286  663 128,063  82,873  
krep 28,696,444  2,792,359  264  23,597  31,979 20,699,963  3,743,773  
kscs 64,240  19,675  6  223  252 43,740  20,133  
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kvt 86,402  12,794  7  216  300 70,621  18,164  
mec-a 70,367  8,690  4  149  171 69,248  17,841  
mec-b 53,914  5,889  6  428  464 31,086  4,728  
medf 185,471  70,224  29  1,125  1,163 136,257  50,644  
meklit 299,875  31,721  19  2,057  2,876 252,232  59,947  
metemamen 209,803  73,908  20  781  1,350 57,778  11,620  
microfund 625,885  89,032  30  1,627  1,357 508,875  92,496  
mikra 6,364,266  1,178,450  47  6,095  5,306 5,008,784  1,717,743  
miselini 1,233,187  261,605  26  11,431  10,617 1,026,639  283,668  
mmdct 177,484  35,066  10  306  372 131,447  43,270  
mrfc 20,132,821  2,786,279  310  81  168 9,133,130  4,642,614  
mushuc  6,020,514  219,591  20  2,057  5,504 5,418,325  1,006,835  
nirdhan 6,641,263  379,855  196  27,457  24,442 3,016,171  846,407  
ocssc 10,358,575  687,762  472  8,452  40,595 7,658,413  1,066,911  
otiv-d 2,020,307  210,520  47  539  509 638,422  194,356  
otiv-s 4,411,129  268,708  56  99  1,062 437,974  298,152  
otiv-t 2,941,473  305,397  197  662  676 673,175  156,941  
pca 8,835,958  1,505,113  206  31,109  52,941 6,885,926  2,543,291  
peace 929,426  106,586  47  3,544  3,656 627,295  92,005  
pedf 501,171  234,748  62  3,340  3,311 254,233  160,403  
piyeli 1,493,827  296,468  33  2,989  3,707 1,206,656  335,354  
pride 854,631  939,232  54  2,296  4,341 854,631  510,490  
prizma 7,716,082  1,231,256  52  10,968  9,916 6,838,978  1,982,797  
promujer 1,496,051  431,071  44  12,395  12,666 1,424,437  724,869  
ptf 1,270,672  432,769  52  8,607  8,196 1,068,881  391,522  
remecu 3,793,554  54,009  29  3,807  13,429 1,483,471  228,399  
rusca 154,752  28,291  8  564  895 100,820  49,038  
scscs 257,910  28,208  7  415  846 157,472  48,229  
seawatch 87,819  50,084  12  1,800  2,000 35,557  1,082,432  
sfpi 1,359,377  145,901  57  6,591  7,015 903,556  185,674  
sidama 1,977,812  184,389  111  4,311  8,529 1,011,798  123,225  
spbd 300,545  186,965  13  1,740  1,727 186,029  56,765  
sunlink  1,191,404  418,246  28  1,955  3,163 1,056,823  415,672  
tpc 2,882,718  594,452  162  28,501  30,059 2,267,148  683,387  
tspi 7,500,759  1,988,886  466  74,634  75,060 5,383,755  2,830,017  
wasasa 408,540  41,785  29  2,274  2,965 274,908  78,899  
wisdom 2,485,619  277,016  103  4,062  8,083 1,404,463  283,549  
xacbank 15,891,317  2,051,752  424  10,608  13,451 9,829,503  1,425,619  
zakoura 15,005,820  3,050,681  472  115,411  117,675 12,444,768  4,448,042  
 
Table 2. The 89 MFIs and values of inputs and outputs.  
 
3.2 Output and input selection 
Output and input selection is a key issue in the calculation of DEA efficiency.  
This study contemplates two aspects in efficiency calculation: social efficiency and 
financial efficiency.  Financial efficiency calculation has a long pedigree in DEA 
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applications, while very little has been published in the area of social efficiency 
assessment.  Indeed, the number of studies that address the efficiency of financial 
institutions is very large.  This tends to be associated with the estimation of production 
functions, either from the econometric (parametric) point of view, or from the DEA 
(non parametric) point of view.  Some examples of efficiency studies in the financial 
institution area are Sherman and Gold (1985), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger et 
al. (2000), Almazan (2002), Berger and Mester (2003), Kao and Liu (2004) and Casu et 
al. (2004). 
By far the most popular approach to modelling financial efficiencies is DEA.  
But within this approach, there is a debate between those researchers who see a 
financial institution as a production unit, and those who see it as an intermediation unit 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Athanassoupoulos, 1997).  Under the production approach, 
financial institutions are treated as firms that use physical inputs, employees, and 
expend money in order to obtain deposits, grant loans, and collect fees, much in the 
same way in which a factory would use capital, manpower, and raw materials in order 
to manufacture products to be sold  (see Soteriou and Zenios, 1999).   Under the 
intermediation approach, financial institutions aim at making a profit by being 
intermediaries in a series of financial transactions: they collect deposits and grant loans 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977).  In our opinion, the production model is best suited to 
MFIs, as the emphasis is in the granting of loans.  In fact, many MFIs do not even 
collect deposits, a crucial aspect of the intermediation model, but receive donations and 
subsidies.  As an example, Morduch (1999b) argues that the success of Grameen Bank  
is largely based on the subsidies received.  This, of course, opens the debate of subsidies 
in the MFI world, but this is a debate into which we will not engage in this paper. 
After a thorough review of the literature on DEA and financial institutions- 
Sherman and Gold (1985), Vassiloglou and Giokas (1999), Oral and Yolalan (1990), 
and Tulkens (1993), amongst others- we have settled for 3 inputs and 4 outputs.  The 
three inputs are standard in the literature: assets (A), operating cost (C) and number of 
employees (E).  Two of the outputs are financial- gross loan portfolio (L) and Revenue 
(R)-, and two outputs are social- the number of women borrowers (W) and an indicator 
that measures the extent to which the activities of the MFI institution can benefit the 
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poorest (P).  We will describe below how this indicator has been calculated.  These 
social outputs have selected because MFIs claim to target women and the poor. 
Table 3 summarises the inputs and outputs used, their definitions, and their units 
of measurement.  Some of the data is measured in monetary units (dollars): assets (A), 
operating cost (C), gross loan portfolio (L) and financial revenue (R).  The number of 




Variable Name Definition Unit 
Input A Total Assets  Total of all net asset accounts ($) 
Input C Operating Cost 
Expenses related to operations, such as all personnel 
expenses, rent and utilities, transportation, office 
supplies, and depreciation 
($) 
Input E Number of employees  
The number of individuals who are actively employed by 
the MFI. This includes contract employees or advisors 
who dedicate the majority of their time to the MFI, even if 
they are not on the MFI’s roster of employees 
Number 
Output W Number of active women borrowers  Number of active borrowers who are female 
Number 
Output P Indicator of benefit to the poorest See text for formula and its rationale 
Number 
Output L Gross loan portfolio 
Outstanding principal balance of all of the MFI’s 
outstanding loans including current, delinquent and 
restructured loans, but not loans that have been written 
off. It does not include interest receivable 
($) 
Output R Financial revenue Revenue generated from the gross loan portfolio and from investments  plus other operating revenue 
($) 
 
Table 3.  Inputs and outputs and their definitions 
 
We will now proceed to discuss each input and output in detail. 
Assets (Input A)  
The value of assets has been included in financial efficiency models by, for 
example, Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berg et al. (1993), Seiford and Zhu (1999), and 
Luo (2003). Mixmarket defines assets as the “total of all net assets accounts”.  This 
value has been taken directly from the 31 December 2003 Mixmarket database. 
Operating Cost (Input C)  
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Operating cost –or similar inputs- have been suggested by Athanassoupoulos 
(1997), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Pastor (1999) and Worthington (1998).  
Operating expense is defined by Mixmarket as “expenses related to operations, such as 
all personnel expenses, rent and utilities, transportation, office supplies, and 
depreciation”.  
Number of Employees (Input E) 
The number of employees has been proposed as an input by Berg et al.  (1993), 
Athanassoupoulos (1997), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Sherman and Gold (1985), 
Seiford and Zhu (1999), and Luo (2003) among others. In this study it contains: “the 
number of individuals who are actively employed by the MFI. This includes contract 
employees or advisors who dedicate the majority of their time to the MFI, even if they 
are not on the MFI’s roster of employees”. 
Number of women borrowers (Output W) 
Poverty is not solely an economic concept. Social conditions and the exercise of 
power are other aspects of poverty.  This brings to the fore the issue of female 
empowerment.  Thanks to microcredit, women can raise their status at home and within 
their society (Amin et al., 1994; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999).  Microcredit 
empowers women by strengthening their economic roles and increasing their 
contribution to their families’ support (Hashemi et al., 1996); so that they can play an 
active role in the development process (Goetz and Gupta, 1996).  The number of women 
borrowers is measured by the number of active borrowers who are female, as given in 
the Mixmarket database and directly calculated from it.  
Indicator of benefit to the poorest (Output P) 
An important aim of microcredit is to fight against poverty. Karim and Osada 
(1998) think that the top-down policy of financing development is unlikely to impact on 
the poor, at least in the short term, and that it is much more effective to start at the 
bottom, by directly supporting the poor through microcredit. They argue that a 
microcredit policy is much more likely to bring about general welfare effects and 
economic growth than a policy that starts at the top. Matin et al. (2002) discuss how to 
design and provide the best financial services for the poor.  They argue that microcredit 
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contributes to the fight against vulnerability and results on poverty reduction.  The 
social impact of microcredit has been assessed, for example, by Copestake et al. (2001) 
in the case of Zambia, and by Mosley (2001) in Bolivia.  The problem is how to 
measure poverty, and the extent to which microcredits are granted to the poor. 
As a rough indicator of how far microcredit reaches the poor, MFIs employ the 
number of borrowers. Mixmarket’s definition is: “The number of individuals who 
currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are responsible for repaying 
any portion of the Gross Loan Portfolio”.  The assumption is that an MFI that gives 
loans to many individuals is playing an important role in poverty reduction.  But not all 
the borrowers need to be poor. Daley-Harris (2004) surveys 3000 MFIs, where 67.7% 
of their borrowers were among the poorest, although this percentage varies between 
institutions. Mixmarket defines as poor “clients below poverty line (where the poverty 
line is considered as population living on less than US$2/day)”.  This is not totally 
satisfactory, as poverty is a relative concept and should be measured in relation to the 
general wealth of the population.  For example, some microcredit institutions aim at 
reducing poverty in Europe, where the poverty threshold is clearly much higher.  
Besides, the number of “clients below poverty line” is often not available in the 
Mixmarket database. 
Moreover, an institution that lends to many individuals may be lending only to 
the wealthier members of society.  Wealthier members of society are, obviously, able to 
meet their loan repayments, and would qualify for larger loans than their poor 
counterparts, as financial institutions of all kinds are conservative with respect to risk.  
It follows that the “average loan balance per borrower” could be taken as a measure of 
the commitment that an MFI has in poverty reduction.  This is an indicator also 
published by Mixmarket and contained in its database.  The smaller the average balance 
of the loan, the deeper the reach of the microcredit. 
We are not satisfied with “average loan balance per borrower” as an indicator of 
outreach in poverty reduction, because it is measured in monetary units, and the same 
amount of money may mean different things in different countries depending on the 
average per capita income. We agree with Morduch (2000) when he writes “by far, loan 
size has been the predominant metric for comparison of outreach. But loan size is a 
rough and indirect measure”.  We prefer to think in relative terms.  To do this, we have 
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divided the “average loan balance per borrower” by the per capita Gross National 
Income (pcGNI). 
                                 
pcGNI
borrower per  balanceloan  Average
=K  (1) 
The higher the value of K, the larger is the average loan in relative terms.   
To illustrate the previous procedure, consider the following example.  Both 
Cerudeb and Finca-U operate in Uganda, a country whose per capita GNI is 240$.  
Cerudeb made lent to 44,796 borrowers while Finca-U lent to 36,912 borrowers.  The 
average loan per borrower is 778$ in the case of Cerudeb and 76$ in the case of Finca-
U.  In relative terms, 778 is 3.24 times the value of per capita GNI in Uganda, while the 
equivalent figure for 78 is 0.32 times. 
Having calculated the value of K for every MFI and every country, we 
standardise them value to the 0,1 range by removing the minimum value of K and 
dividing by the range of K.  In this way we obtain a value between 0 and 1 where a 
value near 0 indicates that the institution lends to the poorest. However, we prefer to 
have a value near one associated with achieving the objective of reaching the poor.  To 
this effect, we deduct the previously calculated number from one.  In this way we 
calculate p. 








-=  (2) 
We would like to see MFIs to make a large number of loans, associated with 
high values of p.  For every MFI, we multiply p by the number of active borrowers in 
order to construct an indicator that takes into account both aspects.  In this way we 
calculate the output P.  The value of P for every MFI can be seen in Table 2.  The value 
of P for Cerudeb is 7,344 and the value of P for Finca-U is 34,223.  From the point of 
view of fighting poverty, Finca-U appears to be more committed than Cerudeb. 
We now turn our attention to financial outputs:  
Gross loan portfolio (Output L) 
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Gross loan portfolio or similar measures are often mentioned in the literature: 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berg et al.  (1993), Sherman and Gold (1985), 
Worthington (1998), Athanassoupoulos (1997), English et al. (1993), Miller and Noulas 
(1996), and Wheelock and Wilson (1999). Mixmarket defines it as: “the outstanding 
principal balance of all of the MFI’s outstanding loans including current, delinquent and 
restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off. It does not include interest 
receivable”. 
 
Financial Revenue (Output R) 
Financial revenue is used by Miller and Noulas (1996), Pastor (1999), and 
Seiford and Zhu (1999). Mixmarket defines financial revenue as “revenue generated 
from the gross loan portfolio and from investments plus other operating revenue”.  
 
3.3 Specifications and DEA efficiencies 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that, in order to assess efficiency in 
financial institutions, a variety of specifications should be entertained, and the results 
should be compared.  In this case we mean by specification, a particular combination of 
inputs and outputs in the DEA model. In order to simplify the discussion of the different 
specifications we have introduced a mnemotechnic notation.  The first part of the 
notation contains the inputs, and the second part contains the outputs.  In this way, 
ACE-W is a specification that includes the three inputs (Assets, Costs, and Employees) 
and one output (Women).  Each specification is consistent with a different way of 
measuring efficiency.  ACE-WP would measure social efficiency, as only social outputs 
are included. ACE-P would be an alternative social specification that would only take 
into account the impact that the MFI has on the fight against poverty. From another 
perspective, ACE-LR, would attempt to measure only financial efficiency.  DEA 
models also incorporate financial and other ratios.  For example, C-R is just an 
efficiency ratio that is obtained dividing Revenues by Operating Cost. 
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DEA efficiencies were calculated for each MFI using the CCR model of constant 
returns to scale; (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978).  The specifications entertained 
were: ACE-WP, ACE-W, ACE-P, ACE-LR, ACE-L, ACE-R, and C-R.  DEA efficiency 
scores for each MFI under each specification can be seen in Table 4.  
 
 
Social efficiency  Financial efficiency 
MFI 
ACE-WP ACE-W ACE-P  ACE-LR ACE-L ACE-R C-R 
2cm 29.87 24.75 28.36  64.70 64.70 6.00 3.10 
adim 15.59 13.35 15.59  64.46 63.29 10.14 6.44 
afk 4.14 1.00 4.14  87.66 93.94 58.35 9.41 
al-ama 52.85 33.49 52.43  79.94 79.76 20.71 8.16 
amssf 34.11 30.09 33.99  53.75 52.44 12.67 7.02 
aregak 36.33 36.33 33.20  54.53 52.57 21.70 10.22 
besa 10.44 3.28 10.41  92.15 100.00 64.32 8.90 
bpr-a 32.01 18.19 32.01  77.26 76.55 12.26 12.26 
bpr-b 28.97 23.26 28.97  60.58 59.57 7.19 7.19 
card 42.14 42.14 40.51  44.22 42.79 6.64 6.33 
cbdiba 22.96 21.23 22.96  37.25 37.19 1.61 1.48 
cca 19.34 9.12 18.77  56.51 57.22 20.25 6.87 
cccp 82.00 40.30 82.00  46.39 50.20 12.07 3.75 
cep 92.62 76.14 90.87  91.40 90.99 14.19 14.19 
cerudeb  6.02 6.02 2.50  40.26 41.79 26.92 6.28 
cmmb 13.19 7.47 13.19  73.71 73.27 6.28 5.17 
coac 86.73 6.57 86.73  77.40 79.04 14.36 4.80 
constanta 21.03 15.93 21.03  53.48 52.07 10.44 5.34 
coopec  1.39 1.39 0.11  54.67 54.57 4.13 4.13 
crystal 9.88 8.01 9.88  45.80 44.87 9.62 5.52 
dbacd 24.27 14.69 24.27  35.78 35.51 8.28 8.28 
eclof 44.93 44.93 29.90  100.00 100.00 14.53 6.11 
emt 100.00 81.27 100.00  59.36 58.69 9.00 5.47 
esed 15.54 14.19 15.54  47.70 47.08 10.27 10.27 
eshet 52.48 21.79 52.48  55.82 55.53 6.39 6.39 
faulu 22.63 20.69 20.94  56.84 59.61 24.13 6.37 
fdl 15.59 10.34 15.45  71.83 71.55 14.90 6.88 
finance 51.25 44.80 51.25  40.83 40.73 3.98 1.69 
finca-t 49.02 49.02 45.87  49.78 47.48 11.72 5.02 
finca-u 42.88 42.88 40.00  52.33 49.53 13.15 5.06 
fjn 17.66 13.65 16.97  79.59 78.12 26.32 11.74 
fmfb 5.15 0.00 5.15  6.58 5.89 7.15 3.27 
fodem 20.65 20.65 19.04  59.61 59.31 13.15 0.45 
fundacion 38.07 37.25 36.47  60.31 59.11 16.34 5.96 
fundeser 26.47 12.99 26.47  58.16 57.44 11.38 4.93 
gasha 31.55 22.44 31.55  33.77 33.56 3.46 3.46 
ggls 21.43 21.43 21.18  25.42 24.34 4.32 1.16 
gk 42.25 42.25 40.57  47.08 46.93 2.83 2.83 
hope 11.34 9.01 11.34  67.12 66.69 6.56 5.03 
iamd 100.00 100.00 100.00  40.48 38.72 5.71 5.71 
idece 7.52 4.20 7.52  43.78 42.49 5.02 5.02 
idf 100.00 100.00 89.30  84.91 84.70 8.45 8.45 
imcec-d 23.99 13.81 23.99  45.94 45.57 7.59 5.32 
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imcec-t 14.49 6.42 14.49  49.46 49.54 11.34 4.41 
issia 22.39 12.85 22.39  51.41 50.03 9.52 5.29 
kafc 6.88 4.19 6.68  90.36 90.36 14.95 11.17 
kashf 59.42 59.42 51.37  46.94 46.40 8.86 8.86 
kpsca 16.37 7.16 16.37  42.90 40.33 9.19 7.15 
krep 28.17 20.33 26.69  68.47 68.73 15.72 6.20 
kscs 15.00 13.53 15.00  48.90 47.97 4.73 4.73 
kvt 19.57 14.84 19.57  69.64 69.16 6.57 6.57 
mec-a 16.07 15.13 16.07  88.57 87.89 9.50 9.50 
mec-b 65.28 63.06 63.13  53.21 53.21 3.71 3.71 
medf 23.94 23.63 23.94  52.39 51.76 3.34 3.34 
meklit 72.35 56.91 72.35  78.65 78.25 8.74 8.74 
metemamen 24.57 14.49 24.57  19.40 19.40 0.73 0.73 
microfund 16.19 16.19 12.67  69.67 69.67 4.81 4.81 
mikra 29.50 29.50 24.38  62.88 72.37 40.52 6.74 
miselini 100.00 100.00 95.34  62.48 62.09 12.10 5.02 
mmdct 9.36 7.89 9.36  57.62 56.68 5.71 5.71 
mrfc 0.12 0.06 0.12  40.97 39.20 16.60 7.71 
mushuc  60.33 23.39 59.42  100.00 100.00 55.81 21.21 
nirdhan 63.62 63.62 45.44  48.34 47.69 10.31 10.31 
ocssc 43.19 10.75 43.19  75.79 75.79 7.18 7.18 
otiv-d 2.90 2.90 2.59  29.96 29.51 4.58 4.27 
otiv-s 4.30 0.45 4.30  11.09 10.32 5.90 5.13 
otiv-t 1.92 1.90 1.76  21.49 21.39 2.38 2.38 
pca 60.27 36.14 60.27  64.42 62.95 13.69 7.82 
peace 29.52 29.35 27.70  61.50 61.50 3.99 3.99 
pedf 25.96 25.96 25.23  36.94 35.74 3.16 3.16 
piyeli 26.51 21.01 26.28  62.26 61.71 11.27 5.23 
pride 20.29 10.95 20.29  72.63 70.45 10.48 2.51 
prizma 47.97 47.97 41.18  74.05 82.46 42.27 7.45 
promujer 70.67 67.41 68.53  68.66 67.08 18.26 7.78 
ptf 41.13 41.13 38.68  59.96 59.26 8.35 4.19 
remecu 100.00 62.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 19.57 19.57 
rusca 28.07 18.15 28.07  53.41 51.32 8.02 8.02 
scscs 29.35 15.12 29.35  57.20 56.32 7.91 7.91 
seawatch 86.96 79.86 86.96  100.00 28.53 100.00 100.00 
sfpi 40.44 39.93 38.46  61.63 61.61 5.89 5.89 
sidama 36.17 20.52 36.17  49.04 49.04 3.09 3.09 
spbd 33.44 33.44 32.74  43.90 43.61 4.84 1.40 
sunlink  26.50 16.17 26.50  63.36 63.27 16.46 4.60 
tpc 46.63 45.21 46.63  59.92 59.20 5.32 5.32 
tspi 41.18 41.18 40.62  51.83 50.57 6.73 6.58 
wasasa 56.33 47.61 56.33  63.93 63.12 8.74 8.74 
wisdom 23.47 12.97 23.47  51.87 51.87 4.74 4.74 
xacbank 7.63 6.28 7.63  54.55 54.55 3.73 3.21 
zakoura 61.54 61.54 59.77  64.08 62.77 10.45 10.45 
Mean 35.53 28.17 34.21  58.37 57.42 13.08 7.31 
St dev 26.29 24.00 25.60  19.12 19.44 14.80 10.50 
 
 
Table 4. Efficiencies DEA under the 7 models -. The last row shows the column 
mean and standard deviation. 
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Analysis of the results reproduced in Table 4 shows that average efficiency for 
the specification of the social model ACE-WP is 35.53%.  Average efficiency for the 
financial specification ACE-LR is 58.37%.  Average efficiency is particularly low under 
specification whose output is revenues ACE-R, and even lower under the specification 
C-R, with only 7.31%. 
No MFI is 100% efficient under all 7 specifications.  Take the case of the MFI 
Remecu.  Remecu is 100% efficient under ACE-WP and ACE-LR, suggesting that it is 
efficient both socially and in financial terms.  However, when we look at simplified 
models we find that under ACE-P is 100% efficient but only 62% under ACE-W, 
suggesting that Remecu is better at fighting poverty than at promoting women 
empowerment.  Turning to simplifications in financial efficiency specifications, we can 
see that Remecu is 100% under ACE-L but only 19.57% under ACE-R.  In other words, 
it is good at placing loans but not so good at obtaining revenues.  We can summarise the 
analysis of Remecu, by saying that it is an efficient organisation whose efficiency relies 
on fighting poverty by placing loans, but that it could do better in supporting women and 
in generating revenues.  We see that estimating a variety of specifications can help us to 
go behind the mere efficiency score to identify the strengths and weaknesses of an MFI. 
Other MFIs could be studied in the same way. 
Some MFIs are financially 100% efficient but reach low scores for social 
efficiency.  An example is  Eclof whose financial efficiency is 100% with specification 
ACE-LR, but whose social efficiency drops to 44.93% when ACE-WP is estimated.  
The converse is also true, some MFIs achieve high social efficiency scores but low 
financial efficiency scores.  An example of this last case is Iamd: 100% with ACE-WP 
but only 40.48% with ACE-LR.  
 A series of hypotheses will now be put forward about the relationship between 
financial and social efficiency scores.  This will be the subject of the next section.  
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3.4 Hypotheses on social efficiency 
H1: socially efficient MFIs are also financially efficient 
It can be conjectured that in order to remain socially efficient, an MFI has to be 
financially efficient, since an MFI that makes many social contributions but is not 
financially viable cannot last long.  The key to survival is self-sufficiency, and this 
implies financial efficiency as only self-sufficient entities can guarantee their survival.  
There may, of course, exist MFIs that are not financially efficient, provided generous 
donors support them.    
Table 5 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between DEA social 
specifications, DEA financial specifications, and a set of standard banking efficiency 
ratios: C/I (Operating Cost/Net Operating Income), C/B (Operating Cost/Number of 
Active Borrowers), and C/L (Operating Cost/Gross Loan Portfolio).  Levels of 
significance are also shown. 
 The correlation between social efficiency (ACE-WP) and financial efficiency 
(ACE-LR) is 0.346.  This is significantly different from zero at the 1% level (two way 
test), but it is rather small.  The correlation between efficiencies under specifications 
ACE-WP and C-R is even smaller, at 0.291.  A higher value (-0.507) is obtained when 
the results of specification ACE-WP are correlated with cost per borrower (C/B).  The 
sign is negative, indicating that the higher the cost of the loan, the least efficient is the 
MFI.  Similar comments can be made if we look at the correlations between simplified 
versions of the social efficiency specification (ACE-W, and ACE-P), financial 
efficiency specifications, and performance ratios. 
 
 ACE-WP ACE-W ACE-P ACE-LR ACE-L ACE-R C-R CII C/B C/L 
ACE-WP 1 0.891** 0.994** 0.346** 0.256* 0.135 0.291** -0,052 -0,507** -0,189 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.208) (0.006) (0,629) (0,000) (0,076) 
ACE-W  1 0.865** 0.242* 0.140 0.097 0.274** -0,053 -0,453** -0,121 
   (0.000) (0.022) (0.192) (0.366) (0.009) (0,623) (0,000) (0,258) 
ACE-P   1 0.337** 0.241* 0.132 0.299** -0,046 -0,507** -0,179 
    (0.001) (0.023) (0.218) (0.004) (0,669) (0,000) (0,094) 
ACE-LR    1 0.918** 0.527** 0.412** -0,132 -0,216* -0,543** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0,217) (0,045) (0,000) 
ACE-L     1 0.328** 0.039 -0,093 -0,143 -0,526** 
      (0.002) (0.717) (0,384) (0,187) (0,000) 
ACE-R      1 0.728** -0,103 0,280** -0,235* 
       (0.000) (0,335 (0,009) (0,027) 
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C-R       1 -0,103 -0,117 -0,213* 
        (0,338 (0,279) (0,045) 
C/I        1,000 -0,030 0,020 
         (0,782) (0,849) 
C/B         1,000 0,307** 
          (0,004) 
C/L          1,000 
 
** Significant correlation at the 0,01 level (two-way). 
* Significant correlation at the 0,05 level (two-way). 
 
Table 5. Pearson correlations between efficiencies and efficiency ratios. 
Returning to the correlation between efficiencies under specification ACE-WP 
and ACE-LR, the scatter plot turns out to be revealing.  This is shown in Figure 1.  The 





Figure 1. Social efficiency (ACE-WP) vs financial efficiency (ACE-LR) 
The upper rigth hand corner of Figure 1 contains MFIs with relatively high 
financial and social efficiencies.  Remecu, the MFI that appears in the extreme corner of 
the graph, is 100% efficient from both points of view.  Other MFIs, such as CEP, IDF, 
and Seawatch achieve high values in both measures of efficiency.  These MFIs could be 
described as “industry leaders”. 
A large group of MFIs, on the top left hand corner of Figure 1, are financially 
efficient but not socially efficient.  While it is desirable that financial efficiency be 
maintained, these institutions could improve their social efficiency.  Under the present 





































































































model, such objective would be achieved by granting smaller loans to more individuals, 
particularly to women. 
The lower left-hand side corner of Figure 1 groups MFIs with low values of 
social efficiency and low values of financial efficiency.  They should reconsider their 
operations, or run the risk of not being able to survive. 
Lastly, the fourth quadrant, on the bottom right-hand corner, contains MFIs that 
are socially efficient but financially inefficient.  This quadrant is almost empty.  IAMD 
is the only MFI that seats clearly in this quadrant.  IAMD claims to lend only to 
customers that earn less than 1$ a day. 
Amongst the 89 MFIs in the study, only in 13 of them was social efficiency 
found to be higher than financial efficiency.  The conclusion is that, when faced with a 
choice between financial efficiency and social efficiency, institutions would aim for 
financial performance in order to guarantee the possibility of being able to continue 
with their social work.  We conclude that the evidence is consistent with hypothesis 1 
that socially efficient MFIs are also financially efficient. 
   
H2: Socially efficient MFIs are efficient in fighting poverty and supporting 
women 
Microcredit schemes focusing on women have become a major feature of donor 
strategies to alleviate poverty, and funding is likely to further increase into the next 
century (Rankin, 2001). The microcredit literature shows that women are a good credit 
risk (Hulme and Mosley, 1996); and that their businesses have a better family members’ 
impact than those run by men (Smith, 2002; Todd, 1996). But Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) argue that lending to women is much more complex than first thought, and the 
assumption that every loan given to a woman is used for her own activities has been 
challenged by Goetz and Gupta (1996), who find that significant proportions of female 
credit  are in fact controlled by male relatives. However, Mahmud (2003) concludes that 
microcredit can possibly reduce male bias in welfare outcomes, particularly in poor 
households. 
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Some MFIs have as their specific objective to support poor women. The Daley-
Harris (2004) survey of 3,000 MFIs, found that 55.9% of the borrowers were women. 
Out of the 89 MFIs in the sample, 12 lend solely to women.  In general, 64% of all 
loans in our sample are made to women.  It appears to the case that supporting women 
is seen as an effective way to combat poverty.  We would expect that those institutions 
that are efficient at supporting the poor are also efficient at supporting women. 
Overall social efficiency has been measured by means of the specification ACE-
WP.  We turn our attention to simplifications of this specification: ACE-W, and ACE-P 
and to the relationship between the results of the three specifications. We see in Table 5 
that the correlations between efficiencies obtained by the three specifications are 
positive and very high.  In particular, we see that Pearson correlation coefficient 
between efficiencies under ACE-W and ACE-P is 0.865.  To further explore this 
correlation, the graph of efficiencies under ACE-W versus efficiencies under ACE-P 
has been reproduced in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Efficiency in supporting women (ACE-W) vs efficiency in supporting 
the poor (ACE-P) 
We see that most MFIs plot along the diagonal in Figure 2 as would be expected 
from the high correlation coefficient.  The exception is Coac, an efficient institution that 
makes many loans to the poor but only 7% of its loans support women. 
This hypothesis is clearly supported by the data. 
H3: NGOs are more socially efficient than non-NGO MFIs 
MFIs exist under a variety of organisational structures: banks, non-bank 
financial institutions, cooperatives, credit unions, and non-governmental organisations 






































































































(NGOs).  NGOs are not-for profit organisations often supported by volunteers.  
According to Dichter (1996), NGOs have a comparative advantage in their ability to 
reach the poor.  They emphasise their social role over their financial performance, 
although, as mentioned in H1, they cannot neglect financial efficiency in the pursuit of 
sustainability.  We could conjecture that, as a consequence of the emphasis that they put 
into social objectives, NGOs are more socially efficient than non-NGOs.  We do not 
expect to find differences between NGOs and non-NGOs in terms of financial 
efficiency. 
Amongst the 89 MFIs studied in this paper, 37 are non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for efficiencies under 
various specifications, both for NGOs and for non-NGOs.  Some differences can be 
seen in Table 6, but in order to establish if the differences are significant, two different 
tests have been performed, ANOVA, and a non-parametric test of differences in means.  
It has been necessary to resort to non-parametrics because efficiencies are not normally 
distributed.  The results are reproduced in Table 7.  
 
  N Average Standard deviation Min Max 
non-NGO 52 32.286% 26.838% 0.12% 100% 
NGO 37 40.091% 25.153% 10.44% 100% ACE-WP  
Total 89 35.530% 26.291% 0.12% 100% 
non-NGO 52 22.084% 20.933% 0.00% 81.27% 
NGO 37 36.713% 25.685% 3.28% 100% ACE-W  
Total 89 28.166% 24.008% 0.00% 100% 
non-NGO 52 31.330% 26.594% 0.11% 100% 
NGO 37 38.263% 23.897% 10.41% 100% ACE-P 
Total 89 34.212% 25.599% 0.11% 100% 
non-NGO 52 57.999% 20.621% 6.58% 100% 
NGO 37 58.888% 17.038% 25.42% 100% ACE-LR  
Total 89 58.369% 19.115% 6.58% 100% 
non-NGO 52 56.838% 20.742% 5.89% 100% 
NGO 37 58.229% 17.683% 24.34% 100% ACE-L  
Total 89 57.416% 19.436% 5.89% 100% 
non-NGO 52 13.963% 17.285% 0.73% 100% 
NGO 37 11.841% 10.458% 1.61% 64.32% ACE-R  
Total 89 13.081% 14.799% 0.73% 100% 
non-NGO 52 8.359% 13.441% 0.73% 100% 
NGO 37 5.826% 3.086% 0.45% 14.19% C-R  
Total 89 7.306% 10.496% 0.45% 100% 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics, NGO vs Non-NGO. 
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ANOVA Non parametric 
 
Wilks’s 




W Z Sig. 
ACE-WP .978 1.925 0.169 742.000 2120.000 -1.832 0.067 
ACE-W .909 8.732 0.004 577.000 1955.000 -3.205 0.001 
ACE-P .982 1.596 0.210 746.000 2124.000 -1.798 0.072 
ACE-LR .999 .046 0.830 958.500 2336.500 -0.029 0.977 
ACE-L .999 .110 0.741 956.000 2334.000 -0.050 0.960 
ACE-R .995 .441 0.508 886.500 2264.500 -0.629 0.530 
C-R .986 1.263 0.264 874.500 1577.500 -0.728 0.466 
 
Table 7. ANOVA test for differences in means and non-parametric means test. 
NGO vs No NGO. 
Table 6 shows that NGOs have higher average efficiency levels in all 3 models 
of social efficiency: ACE-WP, ACE-W and ACE-P.  Turning to financial efficiency 
models, the results are mixed.  NGOs achieve higher average efficiencies under models  
ACE-LR, and ACE-L, but lower average efficiencies under models ACE-R and C-R. 
We can see in Table 7 that, with the exception of ACE-W, such differences are not 
significant.  The only field in which NGOs clearly outperform non-NGOs is the support 
of women.   
We conclude that average efficiencies under the various models are in line with 
the hypothesis in the sense that average social efficiencies are higher for NGOs, 
although such differences are only significant in the case of women. 
 
H4: There is a positive and significant relationship between profitability and social 
efficiency 
Several authors have studied the relationship between profitability and efficiency 
in banking: Soteriou and Zenios (1999), Luo (2003), and Goddart et al. (2004). MFI and 
profitability appears to be a contradiction in terms, but out of the 89 MFIs in the sample, 
58 have profits. The argument is that MFIs need to be profitable in order to be 
sustainable, and that a profitable organisation is so because it can identify opportunities 
for supporting profitable projects. The reverse view is that MFIs are not oriented 
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towards profit maximisation, and that profits, while being important for sustainability, 
are not a yardstick against which the institution should be assessed. 
Profitability can be measured in a variety of ways. Here we measure profitability 
by means of two standard ratios: return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
We see in Table 8 that the correlation between social efficiency measures and 
profitability, although always positive, is also always low and never significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level.  The two measures of profitability are highly 
correlated (0.768), as would be expected. 
 
 ACE-WP ACE-W ACE-P ROA ROE Age Transparency 
ACE-WP 1.000 0.891** 0.994** 0.116 0.206 0.068 0.060 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.279) (0.053) (0.526) (0.574) 
ACE-W  1.000 0.865** 0.093 0.151 0.167 0.062 
   (0.000) (0.386) (0.159) (0.118) (0.565) 
ACE-P   1.000 0.112 0.208 0.037 0.052 
    (0.296) (0.050) (0.729) (0.627) 
ROA    1.000 0.768** 0.127 0.214* 
     (0.000) (0.234) (0.044) 
ROE     1.000 0.132 0.123 
      (0.217) (0.252) 
Age      1.000 0.119 
       (0.266) 
Transparency       1.000 
 
** Significant correlation at the 0,01 level (two-way). 
* Significant correlation at the 0,05 level (two-way). 
 
Table 8. Pearson’s correlation between social efficiency and other indicators. 
Hypothesis H4 is rejected by the data: we have not found any significant 
relationship between profitability and social efficiency. 
 
H5: There is a positive and significant relationship between the age of the MFI and 
social efficiency 
Any human activity is subject to a learning process. As the MFI matures, one 
would expect it to become more efficient at achieving its social objectives. The 
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relationship between age and bank efficiency has been studied, among others, by 
Canhoto and Dermine (2003). 
No relationship between efficiency and age is apparent in Table 8.  The 
correlations between social efficiencies and age are low for all three DEA models. No 
correlations significantly different from 0 were found. We also calculated Pearson 
correlation coefficient between age and size, and the value obtained was 0.382, 
significantly different from zero.  This means simply that older FMIs tend to be larger. 
Hypothesis H5 is not supported by the data.  MFIs do not become wiser as they 
grow older, they just get fatter. 
 
H6: There is a positive and significant relationship between transparency and 
social efficiency 
The subject of why firms disclose information has been long debated in the 
Accounting literature. Parsons (2003) surveys the usefulness to donors of the 
accounting information from non-profit organizations.  A review of this literature 
suggests that firms that perform well are interested in revealing the details of their path 
to success.  We can extend such reasoning to MFIs by putting forward the hypothesis 
that the most socially efficient institutions would also be the ones that are most 
transparent. 
Mixmarket measures transparency by means of a “diamond” system.  The 
number of diamonds increases as transparency increases.  In order to get the full set of 
five diamonds, MFIs need to pub lish audited accounts, add external ratings, 
benchmarking studies, and other information. 
We can see in Table 8 that the correlation between social efficiency and 
transparency is very low under all specifications, and not significantly different from 
zero.  There is only one different from zero positive correlation.  This is the correlation 
between return on assets and transparency (0.214). As the variable transparency is 
ordinal, we also calculated Spearman correlation coefficients. Results were very similar: 
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the value of the coefficient was 0.264.  Both findings are very much in line with what 
would be expected from accounting research. 
Perhaps the reason why we do not find any support for H6 is simply that social 
efficiency is a score derived from a DEA model, and that socially efficient MFIs are not 
fully aware of their success.  Perhaps if they were to benchmark their performance by 
means of a DEA model they would be proud to publish their achievements by 
disclosing more information about themselves. 
Social efficiency and geographic location 
In this section we explore the relationship between geographical location and 
efficiency (both socia l and financial). The subject of country of establishment and  
commercial bank efficiency has been studied, amongst others, by Berg et al. (1993), and 
Amel et al. (2004).   An earlier study found that MFIs operating in different countries, 
adapt to the environment in which they work; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2006).  In that 
paper, only Latin American MFIs were studied.  If MFIs that operate in different 
countries of a continent were found to be different, it is expected such differences will 
be emphasised in the case of MFIs that operate in different continents. 
FMIs have been classified into four groups according to the continent in which 
they operate.  These are: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and East Europe.  We have 
studied the differences that exist by means of ANOVA, and a non-parametric test of 
differences in means.  In both cases we have tested the difference in means  between a 
group and the rest of the sample; for example, the difference in means between African 
and non-African MFIs.  The results are summarised in Table 9, where only variables 
that have revealed significant differences at the 5% level have been reported. 
There are 16 Asian MFIs in the sample.  The tests show that Asian MFIs have 
higher efficiency than non-Asian MFIs.  These differences are significant in the models  
of social efficiency ACE-W and ACE-WP.  No differences were found in the models of 
financial efficiency.  Digging further into the detail of the figures, we find that the 
average Asian MFI has about the same average assets as the rest of the MFIs  
(5,412,740 versus 5,725,557), twice as many employees (186 versus 92), but support 
four times as many women as the rest  (28,439 versus 7,178).  This orientation towards 
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women empowerment must account for the higher social efficiency results, particularly 
in the model that only includes women (ACE-W). 
No significant differences are apparent in social efficiency when the 54 African 
MFIs are compared to the rest, but significant differences appear in financial efficiency, 
as measured by ACE-L and ACE-R.  African MFIs have significantly lower efficiency 
averages than the rest under both specifications. 
Concentrating now on the 9 Latin American MFIs in the study, no significant 
differences are found in social efficiency.  Significant differences are found in financial 
efficiency, as measured by ACE-L, ACE-R, and ACE-LR, the average efficiency of 
Latin American MFIs being higher than the average efficiency of non-Latin American 
MFIs. 
The last set, 9 MFIs, is located in Eastern Europe.  The main distinguishing 
feature of these MFIs is their profitability.  They have higher values of ROA and ROE, 
and have significantly high values of financial efficiency as measured by ACE-L and 
ACE-R.  The down side is that they have lower social efficiency than the rest, as 
measured by specifications ACE-WP and ACE-P. 
In summary, we have found that there are differences between the four regions 
of the world.  Asian MFIs are associated with high social efficiencies; African MFIs 
reveal low financial efficiency; Latin American MFIs are financially more efficient than 
the rest; while MFIs located in Eastern Europe are characterised by lower social 
efficiency levels and higher financial efficiency. 
 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 




ANOVA ACE-W**  ACE-WP* 
Asia 
Mann-Whitney U ACE-W**  ACE-WP** 
ANOVA  
Africa 
Mann-Whitney U (ACE-L*)  (ACE-R*) 
ANOVA ACE-LR*  Latin 
America Mann-Whitney U ACE-L*  ACE-R** ACE-LR*   
ANOVA ROA*  ACE-L*   ACE-R**    (ACE-P*)  Eastern 
Europe Mann-Whitney U ROA**   ROE*   C-R*  ACE-L*  ACE-R**  (ACE-P*) (ACE-WP*)    
 32 
 
Table 9. Tests of differences in means: ANOVA and non-parametric.  Grouping 
variables: Asia vs non Asia, Africa vs non Africa, Latin America vs non Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe vs non Eastern Europe. Degrees of freedom within groups 87, and 
total 88. Lower efficiency levels are shown in brackets. 
A final analysis emerges from an overall assessment of the results that we have 
obtained up to now.  Can we relate social efficiency, particularly social efficiency 
involving women, to such aspects as region of activity, performance ratios, and NGO 
status? To answer this question, a series of regression models were estimated with 
social efficiency as the dependent variable and performance ratios, area of activity, and 
NGO status as dependent variables.  After appropriate simplifications, the best model 
found contained only one performance ratio, cost per borrower (C/B), a dummy variable 
indicating if the MFI was in Asia, and a dummy variable that captured NGO status.  All 
three variables were significantly different from zero, but the adjusted R2 value was 
rather low, at 0.292.  Thus, social efficiency differences cannot be justified on the basis 
of organisational structure, costs faced by the entity, or area of activity.  This can be 
interpreted to mean that it is not enough to know the region of activity, the 
organisational structure, and the costs faced by the entity, and that there is still much to 
be explained by other aspects of the MFI, such as good management, corporate social 
responsibility, and knowledge of the issues. .  Detailed statistical results can be seen in 
Table 10. 
kkkkk eBRatioCAsiaNonNNGOWACE ++++= //_ 3210 bbbb   
Expected sign Coefficient t-value p 
Constant  29.083 7.918 0.000 
NGO/non-NGO + 11.455 2.570 0.012 
Asia + 13.962 2.367 0.020 
Ratio C/B - -0.090 -4.242 0.000 
 
Note: F-statistic = 12.83 (significant at the 0.01 level); adjusted R2 = 0.292. 
ACE-W = Social efficiency (women as output) 
NGO/Non NGO = Dummy variable  
Asia = Dummy variable 
Ratio C/B = Operating Cost / Number of active borrowers 
 




MFIs are at the forefront of the fight against poverty and provide opportunities 
for women. Much debate has taken place on how to measure their performance.  In 
general, they have been treated as purely financial institutions, and methodologies that 
are appropriate for commercial banks have been adapted to MFIs.  It is sound to expect 
that an MFI should be financially viable, since unviable institutions cannot meet their 
social obligations for long.  But MFIs have a social role to perform,  and also have to be 
assessed on how well they meet their social responsibilities.  No clear methodology 
exists to measure how far an MFI meets its social obligations. 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of MFI social performance 
measurement and we have taken it one step further by calculating a series of 
comparative efficiency indexes using Data Envelopment Analysis.  This approach has 
been extended to, and combined, with the analysis of financial efficiency assessment 
also using Data Envelopment Ana lysis.  The process of defining social outputs has 
required the creation of an indicator of the extent to which an MFI supports the poor.  
This indicator combines average loan, number of borrowers, and the average wealth of 
the country into which the MFI operates. 
The models entertained have used three inputs (assets, costs and employees), 
two financial outputs (loans and revenues) and two social outputs (women and the index 
of poverty).  A series of hypotheses have been entertained, and some of them have been 
found to be supported by the data.  We have found a positive, but low, correlation 
between social efficiency and financial efficiency.  This has led to a categorisation of 
MFIs according to their strength in financial or in social efficiency.  We have found, 
with one exception, that there are no MFIs that are socially efficient but financially 
inefficient, something that is consistent with the view that in order to meet their social 
responsibilities, MFIs have to be financially sound.  We have, however, found a series 
of MFIs whose efficiency is low both from the financial and from the social points of 
view.  These are institutions whose future may not be very bright. 
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Another hypothesis that has been supported by the data is that there is a 
significant and positive relationship between efficiency in supporting women and 
efficiency in fighting poverty. 
A third hypothesis that has been supported by the data is that Non Governmental 
Organisations are more socially efficient than the MFIs that are run under other 
organisational structures.  This confirms the findings of earlier studies. 
The geographical area of activity of the MFI was also found to be important, 
also in line with previous studies. 
No support was found for another series of hypotheses.  No rela tionship was 
found between profitability, age, and information disclosure and social efficiency. 
All these findings are not confounded by the level of multicollinearity between 
explanatory variables, as correlations between variables were very low. 
An attempt to relate social efficiency to performance ratios, NGO status, and 
area of activity, produced some significant results, but low values of goodness of fit of 
measures.  Most of the variation in social efficiency performance remains unexplained.  
This can only be studied at the micro level, by means of case studies that focus on 
particular MFIs and try to explain what it is that makes them to be efficient or not. 
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